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The Dunning–Kruger Effect refers to a common failure of metacognitive insight in which people 
who are incompetent in a given domain are unaware of their incompetence. This effect has 
been found in a wide range of tasks, raising the question of whether there is any ‘special’ 
domain in which it is not found. One plausible candidate is face perception, which has 
sometimes been thought to be ‘special’. To test this possibility, we assessed participants’ insight 
into their own face perception abilities (self-estimates) and those of other people (peer 
estimates). We found classic Dunning–Kruger Effects in matching tasks for unfamiliar identity, 
familiar identity, gaze direction, and emotional expression. Low performers overestimated 
themselves, and high performers underestimated themselves. Interestingly, participants’ self-
estimates were more stable across tasks than their actual performance. In addition, peer 
estimates revealed a consistent egocentric bias. High performers attributed higher accuracy to 
other people than did low performers. We conclude that metacognitive insight into face 
perception abilities is limited and subject to systematic biases. Our findings urge caution when 
interpreting self-report measures of face perception ability. They also reveal a fundamental 








Negotiating everyday life requires that our plans are commensurate with our abilities. This basic 
requirement underscores the importance of metacognition—insight into one’s own thinking and 
the thinking of others (Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012; Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998; Tullis & 
Fraundorf, 2017). In fact, metacognitive insight is not only inaccurate, it is also subject to 
systematic biases. One influential example of such a bias is the Dunning–Kruger Effect, 
encapsulated in the title of its debut paper, “unskilled and unaware of it” (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999). The headline result is that poor performers in a given task drastically overestimate their 
ability, believing that they are outperforming the majority when, in fact, they are the ones being 
outperformed (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). Kruger & Dunning’s (1999) 
explanation of this effect is elegant, and points to a cruel trap in human psychology: The skills 
that grant competence in a particular domain are the very skills needed to evaluate competence 
in that domain. People who lack the former lack the latter. A secondary result concerns the top 
of the ability range. High performers often underestimate their standing, but for an entirely 
different reason. These individuals recognise that they perform well, they just assume that other 
people perform well too. 
 
Part of the appeal of the Dunning–Kruger Effect is its broad generality. The same basic pattern 
emerges in reasoning (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017), 
humour (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), political knowledge (Anson, 2018; Motta, Callaghan, & 
Sylvester, 2018), and many other domains. Indeed, the apparent ubiquity of Dunning–Kruger 
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Effects has prompted some to wonder if there is any ‘special’ domain in which the standard 
pattern is not found (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). 
 
One plausible candidate for such a ‘special’ domain is face perception. Evidence that faces may 
be cognitively special comes from at least four sources (McKone & Robbins, 2011). First, 
developmental studies have suggested that newborns demonstrate some innate knowledge of 
facial structure (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Johnson, 2005). Second, face perception seems to be 
disproportionately affected by image manipulations such as inversion (Yin, 1969; Rossion, 2008) 
and contrast reversal (Kemp, Pike, White, & Musselman, 1996; Farroni et al., 2005). Third, it has 
been proposed that face perception may be subserved by face-specific neural circuitry (Riddoch 
et al., 2008; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006). More recently, genetic studies have shown that human 
face recognition ability is specific and heritable (Wilmer et al., 2010; Wilmer 2017). This 
converging evidence from highly diverse studies has led some researchers to propose that face 
perception may involve specialised or face-specific cognitive processes. 
 
Despite the theoretical and applied interest in face processing, no previous studies have tested 
for Dunning–Kruger Effects in this domain. A few studies have found that individuals in the 
general population show minimal to moderate insight into their own face recognition abilities 
(e.g. Bindemann, Attard, & Johnston, 2014; Palermo et al., 2017; Bobak, Mileva, & Hancock, 
2019), echoing findings for other types of memory (Beaudoin & Desrichard, 2011; but see 
Livingston & Shah, 2018; Arizpe et al., 2019 for more positive views). However, none of these 
studies was concerned with metacognition in the ‘expansive’ sense that includes insight into 
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other people’s abilities (Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998). Their main interest was whether a 
person’s self-report (e.g. agreement with questionnaire items such as, “My face recognition 
ability is worse than most people”; Shah et al., 2015) could predict the same person’s 
performance on standard face recognition tests. They did not compare estimated performance 
and actual performance for the same task. 
 
A few face perception studies have examined other aspects of metacognition. Sauerland et al 
(2016) adapted the choice blindness paradigm (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005) to 
investigate insight into identification judgements. Participants were asked to sort photographs 
of unfamiliar faces by identity (Jenkins, White, Van Montfort, & Burton, 2011). They were then 
confronted with one of their identity decisions and asked to justify it. On critical trials, the 
photographs were secretly switched, so that the decisions participants were asked to justify 
were opposite to the decisions that they actually made. Very few of these manipulations were 
detected. Indeed, participants readily reported their reasoning behind identity decisions that 
they had not reached. 
 
Such findings suggest that insight into one’s own face recognition performance is somewhat 
limited. Fewer studies have examined insight into other people’s face recognition performance. 
Ritchie et al. (2015) presented pairs of faces in a matching task for identity. As expected, 
participants performed better with familiar faces than with unfamiliar faces (Clutterbuck & 
Johnston, 2004; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019). However, participants also predicted that the 
faces they themselves knew would be easier for other people to match—even people who did 
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not know those faces. These findings demonstrate an egocentric bias in identification 
performance (Greenwald, 1980), in that viewers estimated the cognition of others from their 
own perspective (DiMaggio et al., 2008; Hinds, 1999; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996). However, it 
remains unclear whether high-performing participants produced higher estimates than low-
performing participants. 
 
Given that face perception is often presented as a special case for cognition, we tested whether 
it is a special case for metacognition. Specifically, we asked whether standard Dunning–Kruger 
Effects and egocentric bias emerge in face perception tasks. We begin in Experiment 1 with 
identification tasks for familiar and unfamiliar faces. In Experiment 2, we expand our analysis to 
include other aspects of face perception, namely gaze direction, and emotional expression. 
 
2 Experiment 1. Identity matching for familiar and unfamiliar faces 
Our first experiment had two main aims. First, we sought to establish whether face perception 
follows the same metacognitive principles as other aspects of cognition. Specifically, we asked 
whether Dunning–Kruger Effects and egocentric bias are observed in face identification tasks. 
Second, we sought to compare these metacognitive patterns for familiar and unfamiliar faces. 
To address these questions, we adapted a standard perceptual matching task for facial identity 
(Burton, White, McNeill, 2010). In the standard task, participants are presented with pairs of 
face photos. For each pair, the task is to decide whether the two photos show the same person 
(50% of trials) or different people (50% of trials). Accuracy on this task is typically at ceiling for 
familiar faces (e.g. Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2004; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019), but is generally 
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much lower for unfamiliar faces (e.g. Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2004; Burton, White, McNeill, 
2010; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019). 
 
This task has several characteristics that make it well suited to comparison of cognition and 
metacognition. First, each trial has a correct answer, so accuracy can be scored objectively. 
Second, the same/different response options mean that ceiling performance and chance 
performance are well defined (100% accuracy and 50% accuracy respectively). Third, there are 
large individual differences in performance (White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014), 
such that high- and low-scoring respondents tend to be clearly separated. Recording actual 
scores allows us to assign participants to performance quartiles, as per Dunning & Kruger (1999). 
Recording participants’ estimated scores allows us to test (i) whether ‘incompetent’ participants 
(lowest performance quartile) show the classic ‘unskilled and unaware’ pattern, and (ii) whether 
‘competent’ participants (highest performance quartile) underestimated their performance. 
 
Previous studies of metacognition have often relied on retrospective estimates of performance, 
collected after the whole task (e.g. Dunning & Kruger, 1999; Tenenberg & Murphy, 2005; 
Simons, 2013; Feld, Sauermann & de Grip, 2017; see Sarac & Karakelle, 2012; Gignac & 
Zajenkowski, 2020, for useful discussions of this issue). That approach has several drawbacks. 
One is that it imposes substantial demands on retrospective memory. Cognitive tasks often 
involve dozens of trials or items, and these will typically vary in subjective difficulty. The 
challenge is not only to recall the landscape of that experience, but also to encapsulate it in a 
single score. To complicate matters, the overall impression may be skewed by primacy and 
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recency effects (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). To avoid these issues, we captured (i) actual 
performance, (ii) self-estimates, and (iii) peer estimates on each trial. We also captured 
participants’ self-estimates of their own percentile ranking at the end of each task, for 
‘backward compatibility’ with previous studies. 
 
In light of Dunning & Kruger’s (1999) findings, we predicted that low performers would 
overestimate their performance and that high performers would underestimate their 
performance. Since virtually everyone is a high performer for familiar face identification (Burton, 
Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999; Jenkins & Kerr, 2013), we expected this interaction to be 
compressed (near ceiling) for familiar faces. In light of the egocentric bias (Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977), we expected low performers to make low peer estimates, and high performers to 
make high peer estimates. It follows that peer estimates should be lower for unfamiliar faces 




Sixty-four UK students (44 female, 20 male; mean age 20 years; age range 18–26 years) from the 
University of York took part in exchange for a small payment or course credit. The experiments 
in this study were approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of York. All participants 
provided written informed consent. 
 
2.1.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
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Ambient images of 20 familiar faces (e.g. UK and US celebrities; 10 female, 10 male) and 20 
unfamiliar faces (e.g. celebrities from other countries; 10 female, 10 male) were downloaded 
from online sources. Each image was cropped and resized to 570 pixels high × 380 pixels wide 
for onscreen presentation. For Different Person trials, we paired faces that resembled each 
other and matched the same basic verbal description (e.g. young woman with red hair). To avoid 
image repetition, we collected four photos of each face—two for use in Same Person trials, and 
two for use in Different Person trials. Each face appeared in Same and Different trials equally 
often, and each participant saw each image exactly once. To ensure that all participants received 
identical tasks, all participants received identical image pairings. Experiments were run using a 
21.5-inch iMac with i5 processor. Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by 
PsychoPy2 v1.82.00 (Peirce, 2007, 2008). 
 
2.1.3 Design  
All participants completed both the Familiar and the Unfamiliar face matching task in separate 
blocks. Block order was counterbalanced so that half of the participants encountered the 
Familiar condition first, and half of them encountered the Unfamiliar condition first. Within each 
block, the 40 trials (20 Same person, 20 Different person) were presented in a random order. All 
participants contributed the same measures in both tasks—actual performance, self-estimates, 
and peer estimates. 
 
We defined actual performance as actual test score, that is, the proportion of correct responses 
in the matching task. Participants’ actual test scores were used to determine their actual 
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percentile ranking (0–100%), and to define performance quartiles for the Dunning–Kruger 
analyses. 
 
Self-estimates comprised two metrics. Estimated test score was an estimate of absolute 
performance, captured trial-by-trial. Following each identity decision (Same or Different), 
participants indicated whether they were sure or unsure of their decision. Estimated test score 
was defined as the number of ‘sure’ responses plus half of the number of ‘unsure’ responses. 
That is, we assumed that participants guessed on unsure trials and answered half of them 
correctly by chance. Estimated percentile ranking (0–100%) was an estimate of relative 
performance, reported by each participant at the end of each task. 
 
Peer estimates were also captured trial-by-trial. For each image pair, participants estimated the 
proportion of respondents who would answer correctly (0–20%, 21–40%, 41–60%, 61–80%, 81–
100%). To provide context for these estimates, participants were informed that all respondents 
were UK students. We note that estimated percentile ranking, reported at the end of each task, 




Each display consisted of a pair of face photographs alongside a set of response options as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Example identity matching display from Experiment 1. In this example, the two photos show the 
same unfamiliar face. Participants respond to questions 1–5 for each image pair. 
 
For each pair, participants indicated (i) whether the two photos showed the Same person or 
Different people, (ii) whether they were Sure or Unsure of their decision, (iii) the proportion of 
participants they thought would give the correct answer, and (iv) whether or not they knew the 
face in each image. Participants were reminded that they did not need to know the person’s 
name to know that person’s face. Each display remained on screen until the final response, 
which immediately initiated the next trial. The experimenter explained the task at the beginning 
of the session using a printed example display, which showed a face that was not presented in 
the main experiment. Following this example trial, each participant underwent two blocks of 40 
trials each (one Familiar block and one Unfamiliar block). At the end of each block, participants 
estimated their own performance relative to all participants (percentile ranking) by dragging an 
(1) Same person or different people? 
9 = Same person   0 = Different people 
(3)  What proportion of participants 
do you think will get this right? 
1= 0% - 20% 
2= 21% - 40% 
3= 41% - 60% 
4= 61% - 80% 
5= 81% - 100% 
(4) Do you know the person on the left? 
A = Know   S = Don’t know 
(2) Are you sure about your answer? 
J = Sure   K = not sure 
(5) Do you know the person on the right? 
D = Know   F = Don’t know 
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onscreen slider (0%, “I think I performed worse than other participants” to 100%, “I think I 
performed better than other participants”). Participants were able to rest between blocks and 
initiated the next block by pressing the space bar. The entire test session took approximately 30 
minutes to complete. 
 
2.2 Results and discussion 
Faces in the Familiar condition were familiar to more participants (M = 55, SE = 1.05) than faces 
in the Unfamiliar condition (M = 5, SE = .43) [t (158) = 44.51, p < .001, d = 7.04], confirming that 
our familiarity manipulation was successful. 
 
In comparing cognition and metacognition, we first examined participants’ insight into their own 
absolute performance (test score) and relative performance (percentile ranking), by combining 
actual attainment with self-estimates in the same analyses. Our main focus is the Dunning–
Kruger analysis based on performance quartiles. We then examined participants’ insight into 
other people’s performance, focusing specifically on egocentric bias.  
 
2.2.1 Insight into one’s own performance 
Dunning and colleagues (Dunning et al., 2003) established the convention of analysing 
metacognition data by performance quartiles. In this approach, participants are divided into 
quartiles according to their actual performance. Estimated performance can then be compared 
to actual performance in each quartile. Figure 2 summarizes this analysis for test score and 




Familiar face matching 
Participants’ test scores were submitted to a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the within-subjects factor 
of Measure (Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects factor of Quartile (Lowest, 
Second, Third, Highest). This analysis revealed a main effect of Measure, with Estimated scores 
(M = 96.61, SE = .49) exceeding Actual scores (M= 95.43, SE = .35) overall [F (1,60) = 5.62, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .09]. Unsurprisingly, there was also a main effect of Quartile, with scores increasing from 
the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 37.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .65]. In keeping with 
the standard Dunning–Kruger pattern, these main effects were qualified by a significant 
Measure × Quartile interaction [F (3,60) = 9.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .32]. Simple main effects showed 
that Estimated score exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile [F (1,60) = 26.74, p < .001, ηp2 
= .31], but not in the 2nd [F (1,60) = 1.81, p = .18], 3rd [F (1,60) = .09, p = .76] or Highest quartiles 
[F (1,60) = 3.28, p = .08]. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant for both Actual scores 
[F (3,60) = 68.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .77] and Estimated scores [F (3,60) = 7.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .28]. 
 
Unfamiliar face matching 
Test scores for the unfamiliar face matching task were analysed in the same way. For unfamiliar 
faces, there was no difference between Estimated scores (M = 79.99, SE = 1.28) and Actual 
scores (M = 82.05, SE = .39) overall [F (1,60) = 2.83, p = .10]. Again, there was a main effect of 
Quartile, with scores increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 
15.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .44]. There was also a significant crossover interaction between these 
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factors [F (3,60) = 8.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .30]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated score 
exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 5.28, p < .05, ηp2 = .08] but not the 2nd 
quartile [F (1,60) = .78, p = .38]. The effect then reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 13.02, p < .01, ηp2 
= .18] and highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 9.73, p < .01, ηp2 = .14], such that Actual score exceeded 
Estimated score. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant for Actual scores [F (3, 60) = 
133.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .87], but not for Estimated scores [F (3,60) = 1.53, p = .22]. 
Figure 2. Dunning–Kruger analysis of the face matching tasks in Experiment 1. The top row shows test 
scores for (A) Familiar faces and (B) Unfamiliar faces. Actual scores (black) and Estimated scores (grey) 
are plotted separately for each performance quartile. Chance performance is 50%. The bottom row 
shows percentile rankings for (C) Familiar faces and (D) Unfamiliar faces. Actual ranks (black) and 




Familiar face matching 
As with the test scores, percentile rankings were entered into a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factor of Measure (Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects 
factor of Quartile (Lowest, Second, Third, Highest). This analysis revealed a main effect of 
Measure, with Estimated rank (M = 60.15, SE = 2.46) exceeding Actual rank (M= 54.81, SE = .66) 
overall [F (1, 60) = 4.65, p < .05, ηp2 = .07], and the expected main effect of Quartile [F (3, 60) = 
91.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .82]. There was also a significant crossover interaction between Measure 
and Quartile [F (3, 60) = 62.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .76]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated 
rank exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 82.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .58] and the 
2nd quartile [F (1, 60) = 14.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .20]. However, this effect was reversed in the 3rd [F 
(1, 60) = 8.22, p < .01, ηp2 = .12] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 84.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .59], in 
which Actual rank exceeded Estimated rank. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant 
for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 1137.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .98], but not for Estimated rank [F (3,60) = 
1.35, p = .27]. 
 
Unfamiliar face matching 
Percentile ranks for the unfamiliar face task were analysed in the same way. This analysis 
revealed a significant effect of Measure, with Actual rank (M = 55.31, SE = 1.11) exceeding 
Estimated rank (M= 46.65, SE = 1.75) [F (1, 60) = 17.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .22], and the expected 
main effect of Quartile, with ranks increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F 
(3, 60) = 82.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .81]. As with the familiar face task, there was a significant 
 16 
crossover interaction between Measure and Quartile [F (3, 60) = 46.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .70]. 
Simple main effects showed that Estimated rank exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F 
(1, 60) = 37.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .38] but not the 2nd quartile [F (1,60) = .68, p = .41]. This effect was 
reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 50.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .46] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 68.90, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .54], with Actual rank exceeding Estimated rank. The simple main effect of Quartile 
was significant for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 219.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .92], but not for Estimated rank 
[F (3,60) = 2.06, p = .12]. 
 
2.2.2 Insight into other people’s performance 
To assess egocentric bias in each task, we compared peer estimates (attributions of other 
people’s performance) generated by the highest and lowest performing participants. Egocentric 
bias predicts that peer estimates from the Highest quartile will be higher than peer estimates 
from the Lowest quartile. Figure 3 summarises this analysis separately for the familiar and 
unfamiliar face matching tasks. 
 
Familiar face matching 
For each familiar face, we calculated the mean peer estimate from Lowest quartile and Highest 
quartile participants. Peer estimates were on a scale of 1–5, where 1 means “0–20% of 
participants will answer correctly”, and 5 means “81–100% of participants will answer correctly” 
(see Figure 1). An independent t-test confirmed that peer estimates from Highest quartile 
participants (M = 4.67, SE = .03) were significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile 
participants (M = 4.37, SE = .06) [t (78) = 4.72, p < .001, d = 1.06]. 
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Unfamiliar face matching 
Peer estimates in the unfamiliar face matching task were analysed in the same way. An 
independent t-test showed that peer estimates were higher for the Highest quartile (M = 3.81, 
SE = .05) than for the Lowest quartile (M = 3.56, SE = .05) [t (78) = 3.70, p < .001, d = .83]. 
Figure 3. Egocentric bias in peer estimates from the face matching tasks in Experiment 1. (A) Familiar 
faces. (B) Unfamiliar faces. In both tasks, High performers attributed higher performance to others; Low 
performers attributed lower performance to others. Error bars show SE.  
 
The Dunning–Kruger analysis of test scores (Figure 2) showed that self-estimates were higher for 
familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces. Combining this observation with egocentric bias implies 
that peer estimates should also be higher for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces. A within-
subjects t-test confirmed that this difference was significant (Familiar M = 4.59, SE = .04; 
Unfamiliar M = 3.69, SE = .04) [t (63) = 19.27, p < .001, d = 2.41].  
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The cognitive aspects of these results were as expected from previous research. When matching 
faces for identity, accuracy was at ceiling for familiar faces (95% correct overall), and was 
significantly lower for unfamiliar faces (82% correct overall). We also obtained the expected 
individual differences in performance. Although unfamiliar face matching was generally poor, 
some people were much better at it than others (range 60–97.5%). This wide range in 
performance lends itself to a Dunning–Kruger type of analysis. 
 
Claims of face being ‘special’ notwithstanding, we found absolutely standard Dunning–Kruger 
effects in face identification. Low performers overestimated their performance, and high 
performers underestimate their performance. This pattern emerged in test score (an absolute 
measure, captured trial by trial), and in percentile rank (a relative measure, captured 
retrospectively). It also occurred in both Familiar and Unfamiliar identity conditions, though test 
scores in the Familiar condition were somewhat compressed against ceiling. 
 
We also saw a clear evidence of egocentric bias. High performers made higher peer estimates 
than low performers; and peer estimates were higher overall for familiar faces than for 
unfamiliar faces. 
 
All of these findings concern matters of identification. Given that other aspects of face 
perception (such as gaze direction and emotional expression) are known to dissociate from 
identification, we next examined metacognition for these other tasks. 
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3 Experiment 2. Identity, gaze, and expression matching 
The purpose of our second experiment was to establish whether the metacognitive pattern seen 
for identification in Experiment 1 extends to other face tasks. Specifically, we asked whether 
Dunning–Kruger Effects and egocentric bias extend to perception of gaze direction and 
emotional expression. These tasks are especially interesting from a metacognition perspective. 
First, gaze direction and emotional expression are dissociable from face identification (Andrews 
& Ewbank, 2004; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Winston, Henson, Fine-Goulden, & Dolan, 2004). This 
dissociation allows us to test the generalizability of metacognitive patterns across cognitively 
unrelated tasks. Second, unlike perception of facial identity, perception of gaze direction and 
emotional expression have both been associated with cognitive insight, in the specific sense of 
inferring other people’s mental states from their behaviour (Calder et al., 2002; Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998; Simpson & Crandall, 1972). Given that the ability to infer mental states seems 
related to metacognition, it is possible that individuals who perform especially well in these 
tasks will also demonstrate especially high metacognitive insight (and vice versa). 
 
To extend our analysis to ‘cognitive insight’ signals from the face, we adapted the identity 
matching task from Experiment 1 to assess perception of gaze direction and emotional 
expression. To allow replication of key findings, and to facilitate comparison across diverse tasks, 
we also repeated the unfamiliar face matching task from Experiment 1. The task format 
(Same/Different judgements to paired images) and task measures (Actual versus Estimated test 
scores and percentile ranks) were the same in all three tasks. This homology ensured that data 
from all three tasks could be analysed in the same way. 
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Based on previous studies, we expected actual performance on the identity, gaze, and 
expression tasks to be either uncorrelated (identity versus gaze; identity versus expression) or 
weakly correlated (gaze versus expression). Our main interest was whether similar 
metacognitive patterns emerged in all three tasks. If our gaze and expression tasks require 
metacognitive insight, then people with the greatest insight should perform best, and people 
with the least insight should perform worst. In that case, the Dunning–Kruger Effect and the 
egocentric bias should break down. On the other hand, if metacognitive biases generalize even 
across tasks that are not correlated at the cognitive level, then the Dunning–Kruger Effect and 




Sixty-four UK students (56 female, 8 male; mean age = 20 years; age range 18–26 years) from 
the University of York took part in exchange for a small payment or course credit. None of these 
volunteers participated in Experiment 1. 
 
3.1.2 Stimuli 
Face identity task 
Stimuli for the identity matching task were the same as for the unfamiliar face matching task in 
Experiment 1 (See Figure 1 and Figure 4). As all of the faces were now unfamiliar, we omitted 
the image-by-image familiarity check (Questions 4 & 5 in Figure 1). 
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Gaze direction task 
Stimuli for the gaze matching task were drawn from Jenkins, Beaver, and Calder (2006). We 
selected eight models (4 female, 4 male), each posing five gaze directions (10° left [L10], 5° left 
[L05], straight ahead [S00], 5° right [R05], 10° right [R10]; 40 images in total). Each face was 
presented in an elliptical mask measuring 230 pixels high × 205 pixels wide. Stimulus pairs 
always combined two identities of the same sex. For each combination, we created a Same 
Direction pair (two faces looking in the same direction: L10, L05, S00, R05, or R10) and a 
Different Direction pair (two faces looking in different directions). To ensure a range of difficulty, 
Different Direction pairs differed by 5° (S00 vs R05; S00 vs R05), 10° (L05 vs R05), or 20° (L10 vs 
R10; R10 vs L10). To make deviations from the midline easier to discern, the two faces in each 
pair were arranged vertically rather than horizontally (see Figure 4). Each face appeared once at 
the top and once at the bottom in both a Same Direction and a Different Direction trial, resulting 
in a total of 80 trials.  
Figure 4. Example face matching stimuli from Experiment 2. (A) Identity matching. (B) Gaze matching. (C) 
Expression matching. 
 
A B C 
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Expression task 
Stimuli for the expression matching task were drawn from the Facial Expressions of 
Emotion: Stimuli and Tests (FEEST) dataset (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 
2002). Given that facial expressions of happiness are reliably recognized (Ekman, Friesen, & 
Ellsworth, 1972; Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008), we excluded happiness images to avoid ceiling 
effects. We selected five female models, each posing five facial expressions of emotion (anger, 
disgust, fear, surprise, and sadness; 25 images in total). Each face image measured 362 pixels 
high × 241 pixels wide. Stimulus pairs always combined two identities. Each image was 
combined with each identity in a Same Emotion pair (two faces expressing the same emotion) 
and a Different Emotion pair (two faces expressing different emotions), resulting in a total of 
100 trials. The two images in each pair were arranged horizontally (see Figure 4). Each identity 
and each emotion appeared equally often on the left and on the right. 
 
3.1.3 Design  
All participants completed the Identity, Gaze, and Expression matching tasks in separate blocks. 
Block order was counterbalanced with respect to participants so that each task could be 
encountered first, second, or third. Within each block, trials were presented in a random order. 
All participants contributed the same measures in all three tasks—actual performance, self-




The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except for the following changes. Participants 
now completed three matching tasks (Identity, Gaze Direction, Emotional Expression), making 
Same/Different judgements according to the task. As before, participants indicated whether 
they were Sure or Unsure of each decision, and estimated the proportion of participants (UK 
students) they thought would give the correct answer. The entire test session took 
approximately 40 minutes to complete. 
 
3.2 Results and discussion 
Before proceeding to the metacognitive analyses, we first examined performance on each of the 
three face matching tasks. At the group level, actual scores were very similar for the three tasks 
(Identity M= 78.91, SE = .39; Gaze M= 80.54, SE = .41; Expression M= 82.21, SE = .30), indicating 
similar levels of overall difficulty. Importantly however, there was no significant correlation 
between actual scores in the Identity and Gaze tasks [r (62) = .13, p = .31], or between the 
Identity and Expression tasks [r (62) = .15, p = .25]. There was a moderate correlation between 
actual scores in the Gaze and Expression tasks [r (62) = .30, p < .05]. For actual rankings, there 
were no significant correlations between any of the tasks [Identity and Gaze r (62) = .15, p = .25; 
Identity and Expression r (62) = .20, p = .12; Gaze and Expression r (62) = .17, p = .17]. In sum, 
the pattern of performance is as expected based on previous work. Invariant and changeable 
aspects of faces cleave together to some extent, but correlations between different face tasks 
are otherwise low. 
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Our metacognitive analysis follows the same plan as Experiment 1. We first examine 
participants’ insight into their own absolute performance (test score) and relative performance 
(percentile ranking), by combining actual attainment with self-estimates in a Dunning–Kruger 
analysis for each task. We then examine participants’ insight into other people’s performance, 
focusing specifically on egocentric bias. Finally, we consider the stability of cognition and 
metacognition across different face tasks. 
 
3.2.1 Insight into one’s own performance 
As in Experiment 1, participants were divided into quartiles according to actual performance. 
Estimated performance was then compared to actual performance in each quartile. Figure 5 
summarises this analysis for test score and percentile ranking, separately for the Identity, Gaze, 




Test scores were submitted to a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of Measure 
(Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects factor of Quartile (Lowest, Second, 
Third, Highest). This analysis revealed a main effect of Measure, with Estimated scores (M = 
83.03, SE = 1.04) exceeding Actual scores (M= 78.91, SE = .39) overall [F (1, 60) = 14.25, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .19]. There was also a main effect of Quartile, with scores increasing from the lowest 
quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 29.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .59]. These main effects were 
qualified by a significant Measure × Quartile interaction [F (3, 60) = 19.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .49]. 
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Simple main effects showed that Estimated score exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile 
[F (1,60) = 59.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .50] and the 2nd quartile [F (1,60) = 6.73, p < .05, ηp2 = .10], but 
not for the 3rd quartile [F (1,60) = .12, p = .73]. The effect then reversed in the Highest quartiles 
[F (1,60) = 8.14, p < .01, ηp2 = .12]. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant for Actual 
scores [F (3,60) = 192.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .91] but not for Estimated scores [F (3,60) = .61, p = .61]. 
 
Gaze matching 
Test scores for the gaze matching task were analysed in the same way. Again, there was a main 
effect of Measure, with Estimated scores (M = 91.59, SE = .76) exceeding Actual scores (M= 
80.54, SE = .41) overall [F (1, 60) = 166.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .74] and a main effect of Quartile, with 
scores increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile [F (3, 60) = 20.03, p < .001, ηp2 
= .50]. These main effects were also qualified by a significant Measure × Quartile interaction [F 
(3, 60) = 17.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .47]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated score exceeded 
Actual score in the Lowest quartile [F (1,60) = 145.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .71], the 2nd quartile [F 
(1,60) = 64.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .52] and the 3rd quartile [F (1,60) = 20.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .26], but 
not for the Highest quartiles [F (1,60) = 3.21, p = .08]. The simple main effect of Quartile was 
significant for Actual scores [F (3,60) = 83.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .81] but not for Estimated scores [F 
(3,60) = .56, p = .65]. 
 
Expression matching 
For the Expression task, there was a main effect of Measure, with Estimated scores (M = 89.69, 
SE = .83) exceeding Actual scores (M= 82.21, SE = .30) overall [F (1,60) = 75.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .56] 
 26 
and a main effect of Quartile, with scores increasing from the lowest quartile to the highest 
quartile [F (3,60) = 9.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .33]. These main effects were qualified by a significant 
Measure × Quartile interaction [F (3, 60) = 16.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .46]. Simple main effects 
showed that Estimated score exceeded Actual score in the Lowest quartile [F (1,60) = 94.51, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .61] and the 2nd quartile [F (1,60) = 37.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .38], but not for the 3rd 
quartile [F (1,60) = 2.62, p = .11] or the Highest quartiles [F (1,60) = .17, p = .68]. The simple main 
effect of Quartile was significant for Actual scores [F (3,60) = 112.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .85] but not 
for Estimated scores [F (3,60) = .50, p = .69]. 
Figure 5. Dunning–Kruger analysis of the face matching tasks in Experiment 2. The top row shows test 
scores for (A) Identity, (B) Gaze, and (C) Expression. Actual scores (black) and Estimated scores (grey) are 
plotted separately for each performance quartile. Chance performance is 50%. The bottom row shows 
 27 
percentile rankings for (D) Identity, (E) Gaze, and (F) Expression. Actual ranks (black) and Estimated ranks 




As with the test scores, percentile rankings were entered into a 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factor of Measure (Actual Score, Estimated Score) and the between-subjects 
factor of Quartile (Lowest, Second, Third, Highest). On this occasion, the overall difference 
between Estimated rank (M = 51.19, SE = 2.01) and Actual rank (M = 55.29, SE = .91) was not 
significant [F (1, 60) = 3.58, p = .06]. There was the expected main effect of Quartile [F (3, 60) = 
67.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .77] and a significant crossover interaction between Measure and Quartile 
[F (3, 60) = 49.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .71]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated rank exceeded 
Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 46.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .44] and the 2nd quartile [F (1, 
60) = 8.44, p < .01, ηp2 = .12]. However, this effect was reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 22.01, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .27] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 73.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .55], in which Actual rank 
exceeded Estimated rank. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant for Actual rank [F (3, 
60) = 334.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .94], but not for Estimated rank [F (3,60) = 1.33, p = .27]. 
 
Gaze matching 
Again, there was no overall difference between Estimated rank (M = 54.88, SE = 1.44) and Actual 
rank (M = 55.05, SE = .85) [F (1, 60) = .01, p = .91]. There was a main effect of Quartile [F (3, 60) = 
85.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .81] and a significant crossover interaction between Measure and Quartile 
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[F (3, 60) = 109.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .85]. Simple main effects showed that Estimated rank 
exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F (1, 60) = 179.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .75] and the 2nd 
quartile [F (1, 60) = 11.34, p < .01, ηp2 = .16]. However, this effect was reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 
60) = 26.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .30] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 60) = 113.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .65], in 
which Actual rank exceeded Estimated rank. The simple main effect of Quartile was significant 
for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 364.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .95], but not for Estimated rank [F (3,60) = .37, 
p = .78]. 
 
Expression matching 
As with the other tasks, there was no overall difference between Estimated rank (M = 52.52, SE = 
1.78) and Actual rank (M = 54.62, SE = .92) [F (1, 60) = 1.19, p = .28]. Again, the results showed 
the expected main effect of Quartile [F (3, 60) = 57.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .74] and a significant 
crossover interaction between Measure and Quartile [F (3, 60) = 82.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .81]. 
Simple main effects showed that Estimated rank exceeded Actual rank in the Lowest quartile [F 
(1, 60) = 133.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .69] but not for the 2nd quartile [F (1, 60) = .75, p = .39]. This 
effect was reversed in the 3rd [F (1, 60) = 16.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .22] and Highest quartiles [F (1, 
60) = 97.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .62], in which Actual rank exceeded Estimated rank. The simple main 
effect of Quartile was significant for Actual rank [F (3, 60) = 322.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .94], but not 
for Estimated rank [F (3,60) = 1.88, p = .14]. 
 
3.2.2 Insight into other people’s performance 
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Peer estimates in the three tasks were analysed in the same way as in Experiment 1. Figure 6 
summarises the results of this analysis. 
 
Identity matching 
Despite the numerical difference, peer estimates from Highest quartile participants (M = 4.13, 
SE = .05) were not significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile participants (M = 4.03, SE 
= .03) [t (78) = 1.82, p = .07, d = .41]. 
 
Gaze matching 
As expected, peer estimates from Highest quartile participants (M = 4.45, SE = .04) were 
significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile participants (M = 4.23, SE = .03) [t (158) = 
4.42, p < .001, d = .70]. 
 
Expression matching 
Here too, peer estimates from Highest quartile participants (M = 4.46, SE = .03) were 
significantly higher than those from Lowest quartile participants (M = 4.28, SE = .02) [t (198) = 
5.00, p < .001, d = .71]. 
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Figure 6. Egocentric bias in peer estimates from the (A) Identity, (B) Gaze, and (C) Expression matching 
tasks in Experiment 2. High performers attributed higher performance to others; Low performers 
attributed lower performance to others. Error bars show SE.  
 
One interesting aspect of these findings concerns the Dunning–Kruger analysis of test scores 
(Figure 5). For high performers in the Gaze and Expression tasks, Actual Scores and Estimated 
scores converged, but did not cross over. On its own, this pattern may appear to support the 
idea that gaze and expression perception and metacognition have some shared basis: those who 
performed best on these matching tasks also showed the most accurate insight into their 
performance. However, two observations caution against this interpretation. First, high 
performers did not show accurate insight in the relative measure (percentile ranking; Figure 5), 
or when estimating the performance of others (Figure 6). Second, estimated scores in the Gaze 
and Expression tasks were high for all performance quartiles. Why should people think they are 
so good at these particular tasks? One possibility is poor calibration. Everyday life might provide 
less useful feedback on errors of gaze and expression (which can vary continuously) compared 
***
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with errors of identity (which varies discretely). If that is the case, then people should have less 
insight into their fallibility in gaze and expression tasks. One way to test this possibility is through 
feedback training. If people receive feedback on their gaze and expression perception, their self-
estimates should fall accordingly. 
 
3.2.3 Stability of cognition and metacognition across face tasks 
The preceding analyses show that Dunning–Kruger effects arise in a range of different face tasks. 
In all of these tasks, low performers overestimated their performance. For high performers, this 
tendency was reversed or eliminated. Multiple measures of performance give us the 
opportunity to examine the stability of Dunning–Kruger effects across tasks. Do people who 
overestimate themselves in one task also overestimate themselves in the other tasks? Or is 
assessment of one’s own performance (like performance itself) task dependent? Figure 7 shows 




Figure 7. Stability of performance across the three face matching tasks in Experiment 2. Actual scores are 
shown on the left. Estimated scores are shown on the right. Grey and white regions in each panel are 
performance quartiles. Heavy lines indicate participants who stayed within the same performance 
quartile across all three tasks. Light lines indicate participants who switched between performance 
quartiles.   
 
For Actual Scores, only 4 participants stayed within the same performance quartile across all 
three tasks. For Estimated Scores, 15 participants stayed within the same quartile. In other 
words, self-assessment was more stable than ability [c2 (1) = 5.26, p < .05; OR = 3.75, 95% CI 
1.24–11.30]. This pattern suggests that the tendency to overestimate or underestimate one’s 
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own performance is not strictly task dependent. We return to this issue in the General 
Discussion section. 
 
4 General Discussion 
Unusually for studies of face perception, the experiments reported here concern (i) the cognitive 
level, (ii) the metacognitive level, and (iii) the relation between these two levels. We first 
summarize the findings for each of these areas in the context of previous research, before 
moving on to theoretical and applied implications. 
 
At the cognitive level, performance on the individual face tasks was as expected from previous 
findings. In the identity matching task, overall accuracy was lower for unfamiliar faces (82% in 
Experiment 1; 79% in Experiment 2) than for familiar faces (96%), demonstrating the standard 
familiarity advantage (e.g. Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010; Noyes & Jenkins, 2017, 2019). Paired 
matching has not been widely used to assess gaze perception or processing of emotional 
expression, but the present findings demonstrate the applicability of this method to both tasks. 
Overall accuracy rates were similar across unfamiliar identity, gaze direction, and emotional 
expression tasks (~80%), and within each task, the range of scores (~55–95%) allowed 
meaningful analysis of individual differences. Critically, this analysis revealed little or no 
correlation among scores on the three tasks. That is, a person’s score on one task tells us very 
little about their scores on the other two tasks, even though all three tasks concern face 
perception. The observed dissociations among these scores are consistent with previous 
behavioural and neural evidence for independence among face perception abilities (e.g. Young, 
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Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993; Duchaine, Jenkins, Germine, & Calder, 2009). 
However, previous studies have used different tasks, different measures, and different groups to 
gauge face perception abilities. This is the first time that three such abilities have been assessed 
in a within-subjects design, using the common task of paired matching. One advantage of this 
approach is that it imposed the same level for chance performance in all three tasks (50%). This 
uniformity facilitates comparisons across tasks. It also provides a stable baseline against which 
to compare metacognitive judgements of one’s own and other people’s ability. 
 
At the metacognitive level, our findings concern to two processes—self-estimates (insight into 
one’s own cognition) and peer estimates (insight into other people’s cognition). Our self-
estimate measures extend Kruger & Dunning’s (1999) ‘unskilled and unaware’ effect into the 
novel domain of face perception. In identity matching for both familiar faces (Experiment 1) and 
unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2), low performers overestimated their own absolute 
accuracy (percent correct score), and high performers underestimated their own absolute 
accuracy, giving rise to a classic crossover interaction between estimated test score and actual 
test score. In matching for gaze direction and for emotional expression (Experiment 2), 
estimated accuracy levels were higher overall than for the identity tasks. Thus, while low 
performers again overestimated their own accuracy, for high performers this tendency was 
merely eliminated rather than being reversed as it was in the identity tasks. For relative accuracy 
(rank), the picture was clear cut. In all four matching tasks (Experiments 1 and 2), low 
performers overestimated their rank, and high performers underestimated their rank. These 
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measures are consistent in showing that participants had rather little insight into their own 
ability—neither their absolute accuracy level, nor their standing in relation to other people. 
 
Our peer estimate measures also showed a consistent pattern. In identity matching for familiar 
faces (Experiment 1) and unfamiliar faces (Experiments 1 and 2), high performers attributed 
higher accuracy to other people than did low performers. Similar performance-contingent 
estimates emerged in the gaze direction and emotional expression tasks (Experiment 2). One 
possible interpretation of these performance-contingent effects is that participants estimated 
other people’s ability from their own perspective—that is, with an egocentric bias (Ritchie et al., 
2015). On this account, high performers presumed that others can do what they themselves can 
do, while low performers presumed that others cannot do what they themselves cannot do. The 
metacognitive picture can be summed up as follows. People estimated their own face 
perception performance with an “unskilled and unaware” bias, and estimated other people’s 
performance with an egocentric bias. 
 
One interesting aspect of our findings is the consistency of Estimated performance across tasks, 
relative to Actual performance across tasks. This pattern suggests that self-estimates are not 
driven solely by insight into one’s own performance, but also involve some determinant that is 
more stable across tasks. Although the current data do not allow us to single out specific 
determinants, individual differences in general intelligence or personality could play a role. On a 
personality account, some participants tend to imagine that they are doing rather well, 
irrespective of the task, while others tend to imagine that they are doing rather poorly, 
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irrespective of the task. Several previous studies have reported effects of personality traits on 
self-estimates in other cognitive domains outside of face perception (e.g. narcissism, Ames & 
Kammrath, 2004; Big Five, Soh & Jacobs, 2013). Combining personality measures with face 
perception tasks could help to explain the stability of self-assessments seen here. One 
interesting question is whether the same personality traits predict self-estimates across 
domains, or whether any domain-specificity emerges. For example, narcissism might inflate self-
assessments generally, whereas extroversion might disproportionately inflate self-assessment of 
socially relevant abilities, such as face perception. Combined testing should distinguish these 
possibilities. 
 
As well as their theoretical interest, our findings have implications for face perception in clinical 
and forensic settings. Several clinical disorders are characterised by specific face perception 
deficits. In this context, unreliability of self-estimates could influence engagement with clinical 
services. People with developmental prosopagnosia often have little insight into their own 
impaired facial identification (Fine, 2012). People with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) may not 
be aware that they have trouble reading social signals from faces (see Bishop & Seltzer, 2012; 
Schriber, Robins, & Solomon, 2014, for discussions of self-insight in ASD). If people do not realise 
that their ability is outside the normal range, they may not seek appropriate help (Yardley, 
McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). 
 
Unreliability of peer estimates also has practical implications. There is some evidence that 
people attribute above-average face recognition ability to individuals with professional training 
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and experience. For example, participants in Ritchie et al.’s (2015) study predicted that passport 
officers would outperform students at unfamiliar face matching. In fact, training and experience 
have no appreciable impact on face recognition ability (Towler et al., 2019; White, Kemp, 
Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014). Specialists are generally indistinguishable from university 
students in terms of task performance (Burton, Wilson, Cowan, & Bruce, 1999; White, Kemp, 
Jenkins, Matheson, & Burton, 2014). A dissociation between estimated and actual performance 
of specialists could help to explain the enduring popularity of photo-ID as a means of identifying 
people, despite evidence of its unreliability (Ritchie et al., 2015).  
 
In future work, it would be interesting to compare estimated and actual performance of 
automatic face recognition systems on face perception tasks. Although there is a huge literature 
on automatic face recognition (Ranjan et al., 2018; Phillips et al., 2018), very little is known 
about human understanding of its accuracy. For now, we show that Dunning–Kruger effects and 
egocentric bias both arise in face perception. Our findings urge caution when interpreting self-
report measures of face perception ability. They also reveal a fundamental source of uncertainty 
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